The vast majority of migrants do not head toward Europe, but rather remain within Africa and particularly within the African regions. The main regions of origin of undocumented migrants coming to Europe, West Africa and the Horn of Africa have the highest rates of intraregional migration. This is due to (pre)colonial trade and cultural relations and the strong economic and political differences between the countries. The ensuing exchange of goods, money, services and expertise is also relevant in the context of development policy. But how is Africa handling intra-regional migration? The free movement of people within Europe’s Schengen area was introduced with a view to gaining certain economic and socio-political benefits. But what are the motives for establishing free movement in Africa? What impact does the current European focus on controlling migration have on free movement and intra-regional migration in Africa?
Regional Free Movement in Africa
The vision of a united Africa that transcends state borders on the continent, most of which were arbitrarily drawn by European colonial powers, is nothing new. It was already an integral part of pan-African efforts when decolonisation began over six decades ago. Freedom of movement within the continent is one of the goals in Africa’s socio-economic development as set out in Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU), which was adopted six years ago. The African regions and the regional organisations are expected to play a key role in the implementation of this freedom of movement.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with its Free Movement Protocol of 1979 – six years before the first Schengen agreement – can be considered a true pioneer in this regard. The implementation of the protocol was divided into three phases. The first phase provides for ECOWAS citizens to enter other member states of the regional community without a visa and stay up to 90 days. This has been implemented since the mid-1980s. The second phase (the right to reside in another member state, such as for work purposes) eventually entered into force in 1986. The third phase of the protocol (the right to settle and establish an independent business or a company) was originally scheduled to take place in the 1990s. However, the implementation of the second and especially the third phase proved difficult. In the wake of repeated economic crises in several ECOWAS countries, citizens of other countries in the economic community were deported. The biggest deportation of this kind occurred in Nigeria in 1983 and involved over a million migrants, mostly from Ghana. Nor has the freedom of movement protocol been implemented fully at the national level or made use of by the citizens of the ECOWAS zone. Standard border controls are still in place, and the majority of people do not hold an ECOWAS travel document.
Unlike ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region in Northeast Africa has not yet established a free movement agreement. The introduction of free movement is among the goals of two significant migration policy framework agreements (the Regional Migration Policy Framework of 2012 and the Regional Migration Action Plan of 2013). However, there has been little progress in terms of legislation for the region as a whole. The only agreements in place at this time are for visa-free entry between individual member states – for example, between Ethiopia and Kenya, and between Kenya and Uganda. Furthermore, the migration programme of IGAD has been coordinating conferences funded by the EUTF in each of its member states since 2017, the aim of which is to pave the way for a regional regulation on free movement.
The Need for Harmonised Measures
The agendas of ECOWAS and IGAD for intra-regional free movement are progressing very differently for both historic and political/institutional reasons. ECOWAS was created with the goal of promoting regional economic and trade integration, and freedom of movement was an integral part of this. In order to implement these goals shared by all the members, ECOWAS appointed them to relatively powerful supranational bodies. IGAD, on the other hand, was a cooperation born of necessity between the member states and focused on combating humanitarian crises such as famine, drought and armed conflicts that are still prevalent in the region today. Within this context, flight and migration were mainly seen as an unwanted side effect. The intergovernmental focus of IGAD and the conflicting interests of individual member states made any meaningful integration more difficult. Ethiopia in particular has proven to be a rather powerful opponent of regional economic liberalisation, partly in an attempt to protect its own markets and partly as a result of its conflict with Eritrea since the 1990s.
The influence of the EU on migration policy over the last several years has also hindered both regional organisations, which depend largely on funding from international donors, in their efforts to achieve free movement. The current focus of the EU is to increase the effectiveness of border management, which clearly runs counter to freedom of movement. Measures to prevent irregular migration and related human rights violations must not undermine intra-regional mobility and free movement. This would be the only way to derive the greatest benefit from free movement and the development potential it entails. It would not only result in a greater exchange of goods, money and knowledge in developing countries, but also potentially higher private education and health spending and more robust social security systems. To achieve this, African regional organisations would need financial and personnel support to assist with formulating and implementing free movement regimes. In the case of historic and institutionally-established barriers (such as in the context of IGAD), opportunities for greater freedom of movement and regional integration should be identified and exploited. Ethiopian political reform, as reflected by the release of political prisoners and a peace agreement with Eritrea in July 2018, is one such opportunity.
About the Authors:
Benjamin Schraven is a Researcher at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and works on causes of flight, migration due to climate change and migration governance.
Eva Dick is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and works on regional migration governance and urban development.