Uncovering disinformation and manipulation strategies, identifying the actors and developing counter-strategies – this is the task of the Strategic Communications team of the European External Action Service (EEAS)). The team is financed with 12 million euros annually from the EU budget. Lutz Güllner is head of the 42-member team. Diplomatisches Magazin spoke to him about his work.
DM: Mr Güllner, what exactly is the task of your organisation?
Lutz Güllner: The Strategic Communication Unit and its Task Forces, which deal with disinformation from the Russian side, were created by a decision of the heads of state and government of the European Council in 2015: Immediately after the experience with the annexation of Crimea or already after the outbreak of the first conflicts around Eastern Ukraine, when it was seen that disinformation campaigns – especially from organisations close to the Kremlin – had an enormous impact on the Eastern Partnership. And so this team was created in 2016, which has then developed enormously over the last three or four years. First of all, geographically. We also deal with disinformation in other geographical regions. For example, in the Western Balkans, in the Southern Mediterranean, in the Arabic-speaking region. We also look at other actors, especially China, and of course develop strategies accordingly on how to react.
DM: What exactly are you investigating? Social media, state media?
Lutz Güllner: We are not a fact-checking organisation, but we look at how information manipulation by foreign or external state actors works. What are the strategies, what instruments are used? What tactics, what procedures are used? And that is why we have also developed some instruments of our own, among others we have a monitoring system. But we don’t claim to do a comprehensive monitoring of all activities, it’s about illustrating with concrete examples.
DM: And how can you detect fake news?
Lutz Güllner: First of all, I must emphasise: We are not there to be the final authority on true and untrue, on right and not right, but we are there to uncover what coordinated and systematic activities are being used against the European Union from the outside. It is not primarily about the individual case. We are concerned with the pattern, the tactics, the strategy behind it. And here, of course, we can see a huge difference between what the Russian pro-Kremlin media, for example, do and what comes from other actors. And there is a big difference when the whole range of instruments is used in a targeted and systematic way. This concerns the state and state-controlled media, but also so-called information portals, which are sometimes not real information portals at all, but are even operated by the Russian secret services, deep into the Social Media. How that is used for foreign policy goals, currently for military goals, that’s what it’s all about.
DM: Can you explain that with an example?
Lutz Güllner: Let me give you an example which precedes the current events: With the Covid-19 pandemic, we could see that all channels were systematically used by Russian – in this case pro-Kremlin – actors to spread the narrative of “democracy’s inability to deal with such a crisis”. Fake images were used, or content that was either factually incorrect or de-contextualised. But inauthentic identities were also used, that is, networks with people who did not exist at all. In addition, ranges were manipulated to create the impression that a dominant narrative was at stake. This was achieved mainly through technical manipulation.
DM: Let’s stay with the Covid example for a moment: Where do you see the boundaries between justified criticism and manipulation?
Lutz Güllner: The border is quite clear. The line is: criticism is always allowed, provided it is genuine, it is real, it is organic. Everyone is allowed to criticise. But the limit is reached when manipulation is organised by a foreign state and deliberately used to undermine public opinion or state action. This can also aim at undermining trust in democratic structures or sow public anger. For us, that is the big difference. In this case, the term “disinformation” no longer really applies, because it is not about information, but about information manipulation by foreign actors. What worries us is that state actors and sometimes also non-state actors, such as the so-called Islamic State, have very deliberately developed a system that goes from very visible media, in this case state media, deep into covert operations, deep into social media – with the aim to deceive, to mislead and to manipulate. There is a big difference.
What do you do with the analyses and information you gain?
Lutz Güllner: The first thing is actually detecting and expo-sing, bringing light into the darkness. We don’t use classified material to show that there is actually a problem here for society as a whole. The second is: we use it to strengthen our own societal resilience within the EU, but also that of partners. For example, by supporting activities in the area of media literacy, in the area of strengthening journalism, in the area of educational work. The third area, also for the European Union, is the question: How do these things spread? And here, we are working closely with the Social Media Platforms. But we are also considering regulatory action, as for example with the “Digital Services Act” which is currently being discussed at the European level.
DM: Are your results published?
Lutz Güllner: We publish a kind of trend report every week. Everything we claim in these reports is also provided with corresponding links, so that people can follow it. We don’t just use our own findings – we are not an intelligence service – but also bring together other findings from civil society initiatives, from researchers, from our international partners, and thus try to get a picture as accurate as possible of the threat situation.
DM: Is your organisation part of the European cyber defence?
Lutz Güllner: Organisationally, we are not part of it, because we are a separate division. But of course, since there are always overlaps, we are closely coordinated with our colleagues and also see this problem of foreign disinformation or foreign information manipulation as part of the so-called hybrid threats to which the EU is exposed.
Interview Marie Wildermann